Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

G.R. No. 181756. June 15, 2015.

Facts:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress to undertake the effective control and management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport, Lahug Airport, and other airports as may be established by the Province of Cebu. MCIAA enjoyed exemption from realty taxes as per RA 6958. However, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that MCIAA was no longer exempt from real estate taxes upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Respondent City issued to MCIAA a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessment over the lots of Mactan International Airport. But the Petitioner contends that the said lots are solely utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes and should be exempt from real property tax, as per the DOJ Opinion No. 50. Respondent still issued notices of levy on the 18 sets of real properties of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City which sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations. Petitioner claims herein that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from petitioner.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, thereby granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. But it was subsequently lifted by the same court. On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax because as stated in the the Local Government Code (LGC), all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.

Perez vs Mendoza

Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.
When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;
that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review
with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings

Cinco vs Canonoy

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action.


HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.

Herrera vs Republic

 Herrera vs Republic

G.R. No. L-42213. October 23, 1978.

Facts: 
Because of several ailments, to wit: diabetes mellitus, insomia, geneto-urinary tract infection and essential hypertension, and upon advise of his attending physician, petitioner applied for optional retirement which was duly approved. He then filed a claim for disability compensation against the Bureau of Public Schools. The acting referee granted it, but the respondent Commission dismissed the award on the ground that no substantial evidence supported claimant's illnesses as the latter are not disabling ailments, the same being part of the degenerative process prevalent among aging people.

Issue: 
Whether or not the optional retirement applied for by the petitioner shall be approved.

Held:

Yes. In setting aside the questioned decision and affirming that of the referee's with modification, the Supreme Court held that an illness which supervened in the course of and was aggravated by the employment is presumed compensable and the employer has the burden to prove the contrary; that the possibility that the ailments may be caused by the aging process will not be sufficient to remove the same from the periphery of compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the law applies to the young as well as to the aged; and that with the approval of the employee's optional retirement the fact of the latter's disability is placed beyond doubt.

An illness which supervenes in the course of and is aggravated by the employment in the employee's disability to perform his customary work either permanently or for some period of time, is presumed compensable. The burden is on the employer to rebut by satisfactory evidence that legal presumption.

It has been held that where the claimant simply presented a physician's report attesting to his illness and an application for sick leave due to his ailment the said documents had sufficiently substantiated his claim and it was incumbent upon the employer to overthrow by its own evidence the presumption of compensability of the claim of the disabled employee. (Sudario Jr. VWCC, 79 SCRA 337)

 Disability occurs when an employee is disabled from rendering further service due to his physical inability to perform work in the usual and customary way. For purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act there is disability when there is a loss or diminution of earning power which is due to an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. It is not the injury which is compensated but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. (Bello v. WCC, 80 SCRA 153)


While the possibility that the ailment may be caused by the aging process as claimed by respondent employer, nonetheless, that fact alone will not be sufficient to remove the ailment from the periphery of compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Law applies to the young as well as to the aged, and while advancing age may be a controlling factor to the occurrence of an injury, the constant physical and mental exertions, strain, and tension in teaching children of tender age for a period of almost 37 years are equally contributing and aggravating causes which render the resulting disabling injury or ailment compensable under the law. (Bautista v. WCC, 80 SCRA 313)

It has been held in a litany of decisions that with the approval of the employee's optional retirement before his scheduled compulsory retirement at the age of 65, the fact of said employee's disability is placed beyond question of doubt considering that under Commonwealth Act 180 as amended by R.A. 1616 and No. 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No. 133 of the Office of the President, October 16, 1967, optional retirement before reaching the compulsory age of 65 is authorized only when the employee "is physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service."
 

Teotico vs. Del Val

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753

Facts:

            Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor, Ana del Val, had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Issue:
                Whether or not the oppositor Ana del Val Chan, the adopted child of the testatrix’s sister, has the right to intervene in this proceeding?

Held:
                No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. The Supreme Court held that with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio:
                The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

People vs. Leachon

 People vs. Leachon

Facts:
On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge. The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction." From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, thus: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the petition is given due course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19, 1992 and September 1, 1992 are set aside and declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case, i.e., with the presentation of evidence by the accused, then the rebuttal or surrebuttal evidence, if necessary and thereafter, to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED." On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that "urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner." Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. (Misconstruing the provisions of Anti-squatting law)

Held:
No. The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under Sec. 10, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity of legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged "squatters" the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners

Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.

Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.

G.R. No. 146807. May 9, 2002.

Facts:  
            Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM BUILDING). The land on which the building stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, by Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale with a condition that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said lot, together with the improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer.

Thereafter, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of the lots in the Ortigas Center and sought the collection of membership dues from PADCOM. In view of PADCOM'S failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the trial court, but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
            Whether or not PADCOM is unjustly enriched by the improvements made by the Association, thus requiring the former to pay dues to the latter.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that as resident and lot owner in the Ortigas area, PADCOM was definitely benefited by the Association's acts and activities to promote the interests and welfare of those who acquire property therein or benefit from the acts or activities of the Association.

Generally, it may be said that a quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Examples of these principles are: (1) it is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; or (3) one must do unto others what he would want others to do unto him under the same circumstances.

Finally, PADCOM's argument that the collection of monthly dues has no basis since there was no board resolution defining how much fees are to be imposed deserves scant consideration. Suffice it is to say that PADCOM never protested upon receipt of the earlier demands for payment of membership dues. In fact, by proposing a scheme to pay its obligation, PADCOM cannot belatedly question the Association's authority to assess and collect the fees in accordance with the total land area owned or occupied by the members, which finds support in a resolution dated 6 November 1982 of the Association's incorporating directors and Section 2 of its By-laws.

Philippine National Bank vs. Purificacion Vda. De Villarin, et al.

Philippine National Bank vs. Purificacion Vda. De Villarin, et al.

[G.R. No. L-41036. September 5, 1975.

Facts:

The Philippine National Bank obtained in its favor a judgment which became final and executory on August 11, 1956. the judgment debtor died in 1961, and when the Bank learned of his death, it filed, on July 13, 1965, a petition for issuance of letter of administrative of the intestate estate of the deceased judgment debtor. Thereafter, or on March 17, 1966, the Bank filed a claim against the estate based on the judgment rendered in its favor. The Administratrix opposed the claim on the ground that the decision upon which the claim is based is already unenforceable pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code which limits to ten years the prescriptive period within which an action to receive a judgment may be filed.

The Bank countered that its claim has not yet prescribed nor barred by the statute of limitations for although more ten years have already elapsed counted from the time judgment became final and executory, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the partial payment made by the judgment debtor after judgment became executory, indicating his acknowledgment of the existence of the debt.

On September 18, 1967, Porfirio Villarin, Jr. assisted by his mother, Purificacion Vda. de Villarin, likewise filed an opposition to the claim of the petitioner-claimant contending that said claim has been barred by the Statute of Limitations; that the money judgment relied upon by claimant Bank could have been enforced by an independent civil action for revival of judgment under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and that the failure of the claimant Bank to institute such action for revival of judgment within the ten-year period from the time the judgment became final and executory on August 11, 1965 has watered down its claim to a mere natural obligation which does not grant a right of action to enforce its performance.

Issue:
            Whether or not the claim of the Bank has prescribed, making its claim to a mere natural obligation.

Held:
            No. The Supreme Court held that Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." Appellant Bank contends that its claim has not yet prescribed because its right to file the action to revive the aforesaid money judgment was still subsisting when the judgment debtor Porfirio Villarin died on January 18, 1961 and that its right to file an action to revive said money judgment was, after the death of Porfirio Villarin, converted into a claim enforceable only in the settlement of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased. As such, it maintains that the applicable period of prescription is not the 10-year period for filing an action to revive a judgment but the period of prescription for the filing of creditor's claim against the judgment debtor's estate under Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

The records show that on July 13, 1965, the appellant Bank filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the settlement of the intestate estate of Porfirio Villarin and on September 24, 1965, the letters of administration was issued in favor of the widow of Porfirio Villarin, Gregoria Vda. de Villarin. If the money judgment obtained by appellant Bank against Porfirio Villarin became final and executory on August 11, 1955, it has up to August 11, 1965 to file an action to revive the judgment. However, appellant Bank did not actually file an action to revive the money judgment but a claim against the estate of the deceased on March 9, 1966.

Therefore, the claims of the appellant Bank cannot be considered as a natural obligation.

Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.

Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.

G.R. No. L-13667. April 29, 1960.

Facts:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued that “considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:

"(a)A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;

"(b)Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code).

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

            Whether or not the contention of the appellants that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

Held:

         No. Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they discussed in their brief, the Supreme Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.

Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof"

It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.

Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

G.R. No. 152317. November 10, 2004.

Facts:
            The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria Moreño-Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
            Petitioners alleged that with respondent, on March 6, 1992, they engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land where the house stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,000 at Solid Bank Corporation. Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera. Respondent agreed and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,700 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.

However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219 with the lower court for annulment of sale and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

Issue:
            Whether or not the principle of solutio indebiti is applicable in this case.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the payment made by Cross was a mistake. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. It applies where a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.

            The records show that a bank-to-bank payment was made by respondent Wolff to petitioner Cross in favor of co-petitioner Moreño-Lentfer. Respondent was under no duty to make such payment for the benefit of Moreño-Lentfer. There was no binding relation between respondent and the beneficiary, Moreño-Lentfer. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since Moreño-Lentfer received something when there was no right to demand it, she had an obligation to return it.

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 134114. July 6, 2001.

Facts:

Petitioner Nestle Philippines, Inc. transacted sixteen separate importations of milk and milk products from different countries between the period of July and November 1984. It paid the corresponding customs duties and advance sales taxes to the Collector of Customs of Manila for each transaction based on the published Home Consumption Value (HCV) as indicated in the Bureau of Customs Revision Orders, but it seasonably filed the corresponding protests before the said Collector of Customs. In the said protests, petitioner claimed for the refund of the alleged overpaid import duties and advance sales taxes. With regards to the advance sales taxes, the Court of Tax Appeals eventually ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the Collector of Customs failed to render a decision on the sixteen protest cases for almost six years for the alleged overpaid customs duties. In order to prevent the claims from becoming stale on the ground of prescription, petitioner immediately filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed the said petition for want of jurisdiction. The issue was raised to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review, but it was also dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue:
            Whether or not the petitioner’s claims are governed by the rule on quasi-contracts or solutio indebiti which prescribes in six (6) years under Article 1145 of the New Civil Code.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the rule on quasi-contracts or solution indebiti is not applicable in this case. In order for the rule on solution indebiti to apply, it is an essential condition that petitioner must first show that its payment of the customs duties was in excess of what was required by the law at the time when the subject sixteen importations of milk and milk products were made. Unless shown otherwise, the disputable presumption of regularity of performance of duty lies in favor of the Collector of Customs.

In the present case, there is no factual showing that the collection of the alleged overpaid customs duties was more than what is required of the petitioner when it made the aforesaid separate importations. There is no factual finding yet by the government agency concerned that petitioner is indeed entitled to its claim of overpayment and, if true, for how much it is entitled. It bears stress that in determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to refund of alleged overpayment of customs duties, it is necessary to determine exactly how much the Government is entitled to collect as customs duties on the importations. Thus, it would only be just and fair that the petitioner-taxpayer and the Government alike be given equal opportunities to avail of the remedies under the law to contest or defeat each other's claim and to determine all matters of dispute between them in one single case. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments, if truly proven, of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.

Thus, the remand of this case to the CTA is warranted for the proper verification and determination of the factual basis and merits of the petition and in order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play may be subserved. In the light of Sections 2308 and 2309 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it appeared that in all cases subject to protest, the claim for refund of customs duties may be foreclosed only when the interested party claiming refund fails to file a written protest before the Collector of Customs. Accordingly, once a written protest is seasonably filed with the Collector of Customs the failure or inaction of the latter to promptly perform his mandated duty under the Tariff and Customs Code should not be allowed to prejudice the right of the party adversely affected thereby. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it, if any is proven, and thereby enrich itself at the expense of the taxpayers.

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG

G.R. No. 96087 March 31, 1992.

Facts:

On June 30, 1987, the PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0034, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto S. Benedicto, Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al." to recover from the defendants (including Roberto S. Benedicto) their ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which they amassed through breach of trust and abuse of the prerogatives of public office, and in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the land.

On November 3, 1990, the PCGG, through its chairman, David M. Castro, executed a Compromise Agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto ceding to the latter a substantial part of his ill-gotten assets and granting him immunity from further prosecution. On November 25, 1990, the compromise agreement was submitted by the parties to the Sandiganbayan for approval.

On November 29, 1990, the Court directed the PCGG to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the assailed Compromise Agreement.

Commenting on the petition, the PCGG alleged that the rationale for the Compromise Agreement was the Government's desire to immediately accomplish its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto's desire to lead a peaceful and normal life. Toward this end, the parties decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims in the cases pending in the Philippines. The PCGG's authority to enter into compromises involving ill-gotten wealth and to grant immunity in civil and criminal cases had been challenged before, but it was sustained by this Court in "Republic of the Philippines and Jose Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al." G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989, 173 SCRA 72).

On January 15, 1991, this Court granted the PCGG's motion to suspend consideration by the Sandiganbayan of the "Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement" filed in that court by the PCGG and Benedicto.

The petitioner filed a reply to the comment stating that the issue in this case is not the basic authority of the Commission to enter into a compromise settlement of the liabilities and accountabilities of the Marcoses, but the legality of the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which, according to the petitioner, was entered into by the Commission without and beyond its lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion, for it grants Benedicto final, total, and irrevocable immunity from criminal prosecution, sans compliance with the specific conditions imposed therefor by Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14, as amended, in relation to Executive Order No. 2

Issue:
            Whether or not the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which was entered into by the PCGG is beyond the latter’s lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
            No. the Supreme Court held that the petition in this case has no merit. The right of parties in a civil action to enter into a compromise for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an end to one already commenced is indisputable. The settlement of civil cases in court is authorized and even encouraged by law (Arts. 2028 and 2029, Civil Code). Although there is no similar general rule in criminal prosecutions, that "in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on amicable settlements and/or compromises on civil cases under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases.”

In the light of this ruling, and in view of the reorganization of the Boards of Directors of RPN, IBC and BBC television stations to administer and manage those sequestered Broadcast City companies, the authority of the Board of Administrators as "trustee and officious manager" of the same corporations, has become functus oficio. In negotiorum gestio, the authority of the officious manager of a property or business is extinguished when the owner demands the return of the same (Art. 2153, Civil Code). With the reorganization of the respective Boards of Directors of the Broadcast City companies, where PCGG controls 2/3 of the board membership, the Board of Administrators has become a supernumerary. The reason for its existence has ceased. This view is bolstered by the fact that Broadcast City is not a purely commercial venture but a media enterprise covered by the freedom of the press provision of the Constitution, and that under our ruling in Liwayway Publishing, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, et al. (160 SCRA 716), the Government, through the PCGG, may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media to maintain its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. XVI, Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120138. September 5, 1997.

Facts:

Petitioner, the late Judge Torres, was the majority stockholder of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation (Tormil), while private respondents, his nieces and nephews, were the minority stockholders. To make substantial savings in taxes, Judge Torres adopted an "estate planning" scheme assigning to Tormil several of his personal and real properties. In turn, Tormil issued 225,000 of its unissued shares in exchange for his properties in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Makati and Pasay. However, Judge Torres unilaterally revoked two deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay for failure of Tormil to issue the remaining balance of 972 shares. Due to the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay properties from the corporation's inventory of assets and financial records, private respondent filed a complaint with the SEC to compel Judge Torres to deliver to the corporation the two deeds of assignment.

Another controversy involving the parties was the election of the 1987 corporate board of directors. During the stockholders meeting, petitioner Pabalan and company were nominated and elected members of the Board after Judge Torres made an assignment of one share to each of them from his own shares. Said assignments were recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. Private respondents, claiming they were denied their right to pre-emption, filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Panel of Hearing Officers of the SEC ruled in favor of private respondents and declared null and void the election and appointment of the members of the board. During the pendency of the appeal to the SEC en banc, Judge Torres died. Notice of his death was brought to the attention of the SEC by private respondents. Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that there was no administrator or legal representative of Judge Torres' estate appointed by the court. The SEC En Banc denied said motion, and thereafter rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, without requiring the transmission of the original records of the proceedings before the SEC, dismissed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being rendered without the necessary substitution of parties, for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr, when it is sought to justify the non-substitution by its application of the concept of negotiorun gestio.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the concept of negotiorum gestio is not applicable in this case. Said principle explicitly covers abandoned or neglected property or business. Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as they were on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge Torres' will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate. As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31 October 1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings, however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P. Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children of his late brother Antonio A. Torres.

It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the same parties fighting over the representation of the late Judge Torres' estate. It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the probate proceedings of Judge Torres' holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres' estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.

It is appropriate to mention here that when Judge Torres died on April 3, 1991, the SEC en banc had already fully heard the parties and what remained was the evaluation of the evidence and rendition of the judgment. Further, petitioners filed their motions to suspend proceedings only after more than two (2) years from the death of Judge Torres. Petitioners' counsel was even remiss in his duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Instead, it was private respondents who informed the SEC of Judge Torres' death through a manifestation dated 24 April 1991.

For the SEC en banc to have suspended the proceedings to await the appointment of the legal representative by the estate was impractical and would have caused undue delay in the proceedings and a denial of justice. There is no telling when the probate court will decide the issue, which may still be appealed to the higher courts.

In any case, there has been no final disposition of the properties of the late Judge Torres before the SEC. On the contrary, the decision of the SEC en banc as affirmed by the Court of Appeals served to protect and preserve his estate. Consequently, the rule that when a party dies, he should be substituted by his legal representative to protect the interests of his estate in observance of due process was not violated in this case in view of its peculiar situation where the estate was fully protected by the presence of the parties who claim interests therein either as directors, stockholders or heirs.

 

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 144801.  March 10, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Teotico vs. Del Val

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753

Facts:

            Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor, Ana del Val, had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Issue:
                Whether or not the oppositor Ana del Val Chan, the adopted child of the testatrix’s sister, has the right to intervene in this proceeding?

Held:
                No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. The Supreme Court held that with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.


                The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.