Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG


Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG
G.R. No. 96087 March 31, 1992.

Facts:
On June 30, 1987, the PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0034, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto S. Benedicto, Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al." to recover from the defendants (including Roberto S. Benedicto) their ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which they amassed through breach of trust and abuse of the prerogatives of public office, and in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the land.
On November 3, 1990, the PCGG, through its chairman, David M. Castro, executed a Compromise Agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto ceding to the latter a substantial part of his ill-gotten assets and granting him immunity from further prosecution. On November 25, 1990, the compromise agreement was submitted by the parties to the Sandiganbayan for approval.
On November 29, 1990, the Court directed the PCGG to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the assailed Compromise Agreement.
Commenting on the petition, the PCGG alleged that the rationale for the Compromise Agreement was the Government's desire to immediately accomplish its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto's desire to lead a peaceful and normal life. Toward this end, the parties decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims in the cases pending in the Philippines. The PCGG's authority to enter into compromises involving ill-gotten wealth and to grant immunity in civil and criminal cases had been challenged before, but it was sustained by this Court in "Republic of the Philippines and Jose Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al." G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989, 173 SCRA 72).
On January 15, 1991, this Court granted the PCGG's motion to suspend consideration by the Sandiganbayan of the "Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement" filed in that court by the PCGG and Benedicto.
The petitioner filed a reply to the comment stating that the issue in this case is not the basic authority of the Commission to enter into a compromise settlement of the liabilities and accountabilities of the Marcoses, but the legality of the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which, according to the petitioner, was entered into by the Commission without and beyond its lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion, for it grants Benedicto final, total, and irrevocable immunity from criminal prosecution, sans compliance with the specific conditions imposed therefor by Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14, as amended, in relation to Executive Order No. 2

Issue:
            Whether or not the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which was entered into by the PCGG is beyond the latter’s lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
            No. the Supreme Court held that the petition in this case has no merit. The right of parties in a civil action to enter into a compromise for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an end to one already commenced is indisputable. The settlement of civil cases in court is authorized and even encouraged by law (Arts. 2028 and 2029, Civil Code). Although there is no similar general rule in criminal prosecutions, that "in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on amicable settlements and/or compromises on civil cases under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases.”
In the light of this ruling, and in view of the reorganization of the Boards of Directors of RPN, IBC and BBC television stations to administer and manage those sequestered Broadcast City companies, the authority of the Board of Administrators as "trustee and officious manager" of the same corporations, has become functus oficio. In negotiorum gestio, the authority of the officious manager of a property or business is extinguished when the owner demands the return of the same (Art. 2153, Civil Code). With the reorganization of the respective Boards of Directors of the Broadcast City companies, where PCGG controls 2/3 of the board membership, the Board of Administrators has become a supernumerary. The reason for its existence has ceased. This view is bolstered by the fact that Broadcast City is not a purely commercial venture but a media enterprise covered by the freedom of the press provision of the Constitution, and that under our ruling in Liwayway Publishing, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, et al. (160 SCRA 716), the Government, through the PCGG, may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media to maintain its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. XVI, Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

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