Tan vs. Court of Appeals

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO TAN KIAT.

G.R. No. 125861. September 9, 1998.

Facts:

Herein private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of property against herein petitioners. He claimed that he owns the subject properties as he bought it in 1954 from Mr. Tan Keh but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his own favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. He alleged that, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh executed a deed of sale to Remigio Tan, his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the RTC. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the trial court's decision.

Issue: 

Whether or not the trial court's decision is correct.

Held:

No. The flaw in the conclusion of the respondent court that the complaint stated a cause of action is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. 

Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.

Vlason Enterprises vs. CA

Vlason Enterprises vs. CA
330 SCRA 26 (1999)
G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999.

Facts:

Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and executory, the Court of Appeals ordered the Regional Trial Court to take appropriate action on the urgent ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a writ of possession thus placing private respondent in possession of petitioner's barge Lawin. Hence, this petition.

The case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. Several defendants entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. A compromise agreement is immediately final and executory. As to these defendants therefore, the trial court Decision had become final. Nevertheless, said decision cannot be said to have attained finality as to petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Execution shall issue as matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly perfected.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner in this case.

Held:

NO. The sheriff's return showed that the president of petitioner corporation was served summons through his secretary. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of the President binds that corporation. The secretary however, should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case at bar, the secretary was not an employee of petitioner but of Vlasons Shipping, Inc. 

Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the petition. But the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not having been validly served summons, it would be legally impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A default judgment cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default.

Spouses Lewis vs Court of Appeals

Spouses Lewis vs Court of Appeals
 G.R. No. L-47770. August 10, 1978.


Facts:
The Court of Appeals sustained the writ of execution issued by respondent judge for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond. During the pendency of the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, the Court of First Instance decided on the merits of the appeal in the original case of detainer by dismissing petitioners' appeal and sustaining in toto the decision of the city court.

Issue: 
Whether or not the decision of the city court should be sustained.

Held:
Yes. Finding in the light of the pleadings and record that no substantial grounds exist for attributing "grave and reversible errors of law" to respondent Court of Appeals in sustaining the writ of execution for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond, and the judgment below having become final and executory rendering moot the issue at bar, the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

Where the pleadings and record show that no substantial grounds exist for attributing "grave and reversible errors of law" to respondent Court of Appeals in sustaining the writ of execution for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond, and where the judgment below has become final and executory the Court of First Instance having decided on the merits of the appeal in the original case of detainer by dismissing petitioners' appeal and sustaining in toto the decision of the city court, the petition for review on certiorari will be dismissed.

PHILSUGIN vs. ASPEM, et al.

Philippine Sugar Institute vs. ASPEM

G.R. No. L-34081. August 19, 1982.

Facts: 
The Philippine Sugar Institute appealed from a resolution on its motion for reconsideration which sustained the claim of the Association of Philsugin Employees that a complaint for unfair labor practice should be heard against it for entering into a return-to-work agreement with a rival labor union, also composed of its employees. The appealed order was assailed as having been issued beyond the scope of respondent court's authority in view of its function being purely governmental in character.


Issue: 
Whether or not the Association of Philsugin Employees (ASPEM) is still existing.


Held:
The Supreme Court, considering that the Philippine Sugar Institute has been abolished under Presidential Decree No. 388 and absorbed by the then newly created Philippine Sugar Commission, found no useful purpose for passing on the merits of the appeal as it may be assumed thereby that the respondent union had likewise caused to exist.

Where the petitioner Philippine Sugar Institute was abolished and absorbed by the Philippine Sugar Commission by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 388 and the respondent union, the Association of Philsugin Employees may likewise be deemed to have ceased to exist, the appeal is dismissed for being moot and academic as no useful purpose would be served by passing on the merits of the case.
 
Case dismissed for being moot and academic.