Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

            Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

           

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

Ceniza vs. Rubia

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

A.C. No. 6166. October 2, 2009

Facts:

            On May 3, 2002, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza, complainant, sought the legal services of the Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, respondent, in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. On July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

Issue:

            Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 18 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

            Yes. In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification with the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent's claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. The Supreme Court find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are received by the court. Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court. Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.

However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. The Supreme Court found nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent's act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant's mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the status of their complaint. Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Dizon vs. Lambino

Atty. Orlando V. Dizon vs. Atty. Marichu C. Lambino

A.C. No. 6968. October 2, 2009

Facts:

            The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon's move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning. The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

Issue:

            Whether or not the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in “recklessly trying to arrest” the suspects without warrant. It is held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students “cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without renderingit unconstitutional, “they having “a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.” In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI “to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require” and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBICharter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be “in accordance with existing laws and rules.”

Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.

Facts:

Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre.  This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results.  Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter.  The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth of the child.  The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.  In his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character.  His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father despite the affair.  More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making him punishable of Indefinite Suspension.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of two years.  Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al.

PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.

Facts:

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.

Issue:

            Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Held:

            No. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Mendoza can be a counsel if Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 without violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. the Supreme Court held that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject “matter” in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Annabelle J. Pomperada vs. Benjamin Jochico y Pama

Annabelle J. Pomperada vs. Benjamin Jochico y Pama

B.M. No. L-68. November 21, 1984

Facts:

            On February 20, 1979, Anabelle J. Pomperada, complainant, and Benjamin Jochico y Pama, respondent, agreed to get married and respondent facilitated all the necessary papers and documents for a marriage contract which turned out to be fake. Respondent had complainant sign a prepared marriage contract and when complainant inquired whether it was necessary for them to appear before the officiating judge, respondent informed her that it was not necessary because the judge knew personally both complainant and respondent, and respondent assured complainant that he would just take care of the signing of the marriage contract by Judge Felino Garcia of the City Court of Bacolod, later respondent gave complainant a copy of the marriage contract which appeared to have been signed already by Judge Garcia.

A verification, however, revealed that the marriage between complainant and respondent was not registered in the Local Civil Registrar's Office and in a further confrontation with Judge Felino Garcia the latter denied having signed the marriage contract and denied as his own the signature which purports to be the signature of Judge Felino Garcia in the marriage contract. Respondent filed income tax returns jointly with Nenita Martelino Ureta, the latter indicated as his spouse for the years 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 and enumerated two children as dependents. Then in the years 1979 and 1980 he filed income tax returns but he indicated complainant as his spouse.

Issue:

            Whether or not the respondent committed a gross immoral conduct, making him disqualified from the mass oath taking.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed a gross immoral conduct, and in effect, he is disqualified from mass oath taking. It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution, which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). Respondent's testimony was a long and clear admission of illicit liaison with Complainant for nine years, and before that with another woman, and of the filing of false Income Tax Returns. Those actuations do not conform to the standard norms of honesty, decency and moral conduct required of an aspiring member of the legal profession. Accordingly, the petition of respondent to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys is hereby denied. The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all Courts that the respondent has not been allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar.

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998

Facts:

            Remedios Ramirez Tapucar, the complainant, and Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, the respondent, were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a Court of First Instance (CFI)  Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father.

Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case. Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent committed an act of gross immoral conduct, if so, does that constitute a ground for his disbarment.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed a grossly immoral conduct, which constitutes a ground for his disbarment. In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.

All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct--both public and private-- fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

In Re Charges of Lilian F. Villasanta for Immorality vs. Hilarion M. Peralta

In Re Charges of Lilian F. Villasanta for Immorality vs. Hilarion M. Peralta

April 30, 1957.

Facts:

            On April 16, 1939, Hilarion M. Peralta, the respondent, was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted Lilian F. Villasanta, the complainant, who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.

Issue:

            Whether or not the respondent’s grossly immoral conduct makes him disqualified to take the bar examination.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that committed a grossly immoral conduct, thus, he is disqualified to take the bar examinations. Hilarion M. Peralta, the respondent, made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity and his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code involves moral turpitude. His act in contracting the second marriage even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified from being admitted to the bar.