Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

G.R. No. 181756. June 15, 2015.

Facts:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress to undertake the effective control and management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport, Lahug Airport, and other airports as may be established by the Province of Cebu. MCIAA enjoyed exemption from realty taxes as per RA 6958. However, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that MCIAA was no longer exempt from real estate taxes upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Respondent City issued to MCIAA a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessment over the lots of Mactan International Airport. But the Petitioner contends that the said lots are solely utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes and should be exempt from real property tax, as per the DOJ Opinion No. 50. Respondent still issued notices of levy on the 18 sets of real properties of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City which sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations. Petitioner claims herein that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from petitioner.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, thereby granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. But it was subsequently lifted by the same court. On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax because as stated in the the Local Government Code (LGC), all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.

Perez vs Mendoza

Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.
When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;
that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review
with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings