Tan vs. Court of Appeals

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO TAN KIAT.

G.R. No. 125861. September 9, 1998.

Facts:

Herein private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of property against herein petitioners. He claimed that he owns the subject properties as he bought it in 1954 from Mr. Tan Keh but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his own favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. He alleged that, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh executed a deed of sale to Remigio Tan, his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the RTC. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the trial court's decision.

Issue: 

Whether or not the trial court's decision is correct.

Held:

No. The flaw in the conclusion of the respondent court that the complaint stated a cause of action is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. 

Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.

Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

G.R. No. 181756. June 15, 2015.

Facts:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress to undertake the effective control and management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport, Lahug Airport, and other airports as may be established by the Province of Cebu. MCIAA enjoyed exemption from realty taxes as per RA 6958. However, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that MCIAA was no longer exempt from real estate taxes upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Respondent City issued to MCIAA a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessment over the lots of Mactan International Airport. But the Petitioner contends that the said lots are solely utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes and should be exempt from real property tax, as per the DOJ Opinion No. 50. Respondent still issued notices of levy on the 18 sets of real properties of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City which sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations. Petitioner claims herein that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from petitioner.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, thereby granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. But it was subsequently lifted by the same court. On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax because as stated in the the Local Government Code (LGC), all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.

People vs Agbayani

People vs Agbayani
G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998

Facts:

Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City for raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The conviction was based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante Baltazar, the victim and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.

The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the evidence presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.

Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony of the victim in view of her execution of the affidavit of desistance.

Issue: 

Whether or not the testimony is superior than affidavit(s)

Held:

YES. The Court ruled that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.

In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.

Vlason Enterprises vs. CA

Vlason Enterprises vs. CA
330 SCRA 26 (1999)
G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999.

Facts:

Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and executory, the Court of Appeals ordered the Regional Trial Court to take appropriate action on the urgent ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a writ of possession thus placing private respondent in possession of petitioner's barge Lawin. Hence, this petition.

The case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. Several defendants entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. A compromise agreement is immediately final and executory. As to these defendants therefore, the trial court Decision had become final. Nevertheless, said decision cannot be said to have attained finality as to petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Execution shall issue as matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly perfected.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner in this case.

Held:

NO. The sheriff's return showed that the president of petitioner corporation was served summons through his secretary. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of the President binds that corporation. The secretary however, should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case at bar, the secretary was not an employee of petitioner but of Vlasons Shipping, Inc. 

Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the petition. But the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not having been validly served summons, it would be legally impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A default judgment cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default.

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.

Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.

Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.


The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Perez vs Mendoza

Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.
When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;
that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review
with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings

Cinco vs Canonoy

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action.


HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.