Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

Mactan Cebu vs City of Lapu-Lapu

G.R. No. 181756. June 15, 2015.

Facts:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress to undertake the effective control and management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport, Lahug Airport, and other airports as may be established by the Province of Cebu. MCIAA enjoyed exemption from realty taxes as per RA 6958. However, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that MCIAA was no longer exempt from real estate taxes upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Respondent City issued to MCIAA a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessment over the lots of Mactan International Airport. But the Petitioner contends that the said lots are solely utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes and should be exempt from real property tax, as per the DOJ Opinion No. 50. Respondent still issued notices of levy on the 18 sets of real properties of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City which sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations. Petitioner claims herein that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from petitioner.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, thereby granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. But it was subsequently lifted by the same court. On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from real estate tax because as stated in the the Local Government Code (LGC), all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.

Chavez vs. Gonzales

Facts: The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti- Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.

Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the “hello Garci” tapes a case of prior restraint?

Ruling: Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

People vs. Leachon

 People vs. Leachon

Facts:
On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge. The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction." From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, thus: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the petition is given due course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19, 1992 and September 1, 1992 are set aside and declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case, i.e., with the presentation of evidence by the accused, then the rebuttal or surrebuttal evidence, if necessary and thereafter, to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED." On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that "urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner." Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. (Misconstruing the provisions of Anti-squatting law)

Held:
No. The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under Sec. 10, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity of legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged "squatters" the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners

Lawyers League vs. Aquino

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.  The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Manosca vs. CA

Manosca vs. CA 

G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996 

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

 Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Garces vs. Estenso

Garces vs. Estenso 

G.R. L-53487. May 25 1981 

 Facts:
The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.


Issue:
Whether or not the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio is valid and constitutional.


Held:
Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and neither for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

Aglipay vs. Ruiz 

G.R. No. L-45459. March 13, 1937 

Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.


Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.


Held:
No. Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pamil vs. Teleron

Pamil vs. Teleron

G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978

Facts:

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Albuquerque, Bohol. He was also proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code; “in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.” In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of the revised administrative code.

Issue:

Whether or not the Revised Administrative Code is no longer operative.

Held:

Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion:

J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”

Estrada vs. Escritor

Estrada vs. Escritor 

A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 

Facts: Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct.

Held: No. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC. Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice. Judge Caoibes endorsed the complaint to Executive Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., who, in turn, endorsed the same to Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On July 17, 2001, the Court, upon recommendation of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, directed Escritor to comment on the charge against her. In her comment, Escritor reiterated her religious congregation's approval of her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.

Facts:

            Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:

            Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held:

            No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

           

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 

 Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of religion clause in the Constitution.

Held:

No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. But the R.A. recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 

What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship.

Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
G.R. No. L-14078. March 7, 1919

Facts:

            Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extend over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: “With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” was challenged.

Issue:

Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.

Held:

No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power,  And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power.  The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”