Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
            Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:
            Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held:
            No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
           
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

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