Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092.
September 1, 1994.
Facts:
The
records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the
officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente
Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited
from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was
made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles,
an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with
Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash the information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No.
1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes,
but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a
chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued. On December
29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco
and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to
each pay a fine of P200.00.
Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that
the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good
faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been
criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564
which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case. Both
accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal,
hence the case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21,
1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower
court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act
committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing
petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months
and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court. Thus it is that a fine
of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy
eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of
whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a
nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling
matter.
This Court is gratified that it can now grant
this case the benefit of a final adjudication. Petitioner questions the
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the
term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions
of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes; (2) penal
laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a
religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not
the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose.
Held:
No. The
constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the
constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of
that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining
a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
Hence, even the exercise of religion may be
regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect
its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before
permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. It
does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free
exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated.
It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not
necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of
religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the
adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public
interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does
not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint
on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to
determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes.
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