Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120138. September 5, 1997.

Facts:

Petitioner, the late Judge Torres, was the majority stockholder of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation (Tormil), while private respondents, his nieces and nephews, were the minority stockholders. To make substantial savings in taxes, Judge Torres adopted an "estate planning" scheme assigning to Tormil several of his personal and real properties. In turn, Tormil issued 225,000 of its unissued shares in exchange for his properties in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Makati and Pasay. However, Judge Torres unilaterally revoked two deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay for failure of Tormil to issue the remaining balance of 972 shares. Due to the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay properties from the corporation's inventory of assets and financial records, private respondent filed a complaint with the SEC to compel Judge Torres to deliver to the corporation the two deeds of assignment.

Another controversy involving the parties was the election of the 1987 corporate board of directors. During the stockholders meeting, petitioner Pabalan and company were nominated and elected members of the Board after Judge Torres made an assignment of one share to each of them from his own shares. Said assignments were recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. Private respondents, claiming they were denied their right to pre-emption, filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Panel of Hearing Officers of the SEC ruled in favor of private respondents and declared null and void the election and appointment of the members of the board. During the pendency of the appeal to the SEC en banc, Judge Torres died. Notice of his death was brought to the attention of the SEC by private respondents. Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that there was no administrator or legal representative of Judge Torres' estate appointed by the court. The SEC En Banc denied said motion, and thereafter rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, without requiring the transmission of the original records of the proceedings before the SEC, dismissed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being rendered without the necessary substitution of parties, for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr, when it is sought to justify the non-substitution by its application of the concept of negotiorun gestio.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the concept of negotiorum gestio is not applicable in this case. Said principle explicitly covers abandoned or neglected property or business. Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as they were on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge Torres' will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate. As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31 October 1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings, however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P. Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children of his late brother Antonio A. Torres.

It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the same parties fighting over the representation of the late Judge Torres' estate. It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the probate proceedings of Judge Torres' holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres' estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.

It is appropriate to mention here that when Judge Torres died on April 3, 1991, the SEC en banc had already fully heard the parties and what remained was the evaluation of the evidence and rendition of the judgment. Further, petitioners filed their motions to suspend proceedings only after more than two (2) years from the death of Judge Torres. Petitioners' counsel was even remiss in his duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Instead, it was private respondents who informed the SEC of Judge Torres' death through a manifestation dated 24 April 1991.

For the SEC en banc to have suspended the proceedings to await the appointment of the legal representative by the estate was impractical and would have caused undue delay in the proceedings and a denial of justice. There is no telling when the probate court will decide the issue, which may still be appealed to the higher courts.

In any case, there has been no final disposition of the properties of the late Judge Torres before the SEC. On the contrary, the decision of the SEC en banc as affirmed by the Court of Appeals served to protect and preserve his estate. Consequently, the rule that when a party dies, he should be substituted by his legal representative to protect the interests of his estate in observance of due process was not violated in this case in view of its peculiar situation where the estate was fully protected by the presence of the parties who claim interests therein either as directors, stockholders or heirs.