Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996.
Facts:
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly
organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs,
doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other
religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992,
petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128.
The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on
the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law." Petitioner pursued two
(2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it
appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No.
128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the
President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board
allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast. On December 14, 1992,
petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It
cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code. On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing
on petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally
argued and then marked their documentary evidence. After evaluating the
evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on petitioner's bond of P10,000.00. The trial court set the
pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. The
pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is basically the evidence they
submitted in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of
the case was set and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an
amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show that after
submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment, on December 15,
1993, the dispositive portion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying:
(a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring
petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board
opposed the motion. On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration. On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials
constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series
"indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs."
Issue:
Whether or not the "Ang Iglesia
Ni Cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
Held:
Yes. Freedom of religion has been
accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this
preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Thus, any act
that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true
in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. Regional Trial Court’s ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. “Attack” is different from “offend” any race or
religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it
is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and
to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics; the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said
religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging
the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary
to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to
the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply
the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves
the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly,
unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the
boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which
cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors."
A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not
left to administrative agencies.
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