Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.

Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.

Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.


The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Perez vs Mendoza

Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.
When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;
that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review
with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings

Cinco vs Canonoy

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action.


HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.

Corporate Managers and Consultants, Inc. vs Acosta

CORPORATE MANAGERS AND CONSULTANTS, INC., complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL B. ACOSTA, Municipal Judge of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch IV, respondent.

A.M. No. 2680-MJ. March 30, 1982.

Facts:

Respondent Judge was charged administratively for having acted on complainant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Return Unused Rental to the Defendant in an action for ejectment only after the lapse of more than eight (8) months from the submission thereof for resolution, which is far beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days required by law for resolving motions. In his answer, respondent averred that it was "premature to act favorably" on complainant's Motion inasmuch as evidence had not yet been introduced, and the parties to the ejectment case were in the process of negotiating an amicable settlement.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge violated the prescribed period for resolving motions.
 
Held: 
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge clearly violated the prescribed 90-day period for resolving motions. It appearing that respondent Judge has not committed the same dereliction before, he is admonished and warned that a repetition of such infraction will be severely dealt with. Where the respondent Judge resolved a Motion after a lapse of more than eight (8) months from the submission thereof for resolution, it is clear that said Judge committed an infraction of the reglementary period of ninety (90) days required by law for resolving motions. He should be admonished and warned that a repetition of such infraction will be severely dealt with.

Herrera vs Republic

 Herrera vs Republic

G.R. No. L-42213. October 23, 1978.

Facts: 
Because of several ailments, to wit: diabetes mellitus, insomia, geneto-urinary tract infection and essential hypertension, and upon advise of his attending physician, petitioner applied for optional retirement which was duly approved. He then filed a claim for disability compensation against the Bureau of Public Schools. The acting referee granted it, but the respondent Commission dismissed the award on the ground that no substantial evidence supported claimant's illnesses as the latter are not disabling ailments, the same being part of the degenerative process prevalent among aging people.

Issue: 
Whether or not the optional retirement applied for by the petitioner shall be approved.

Held:

Yes. In setting aside the questioned decision and affirming that of the referee's with modification, the Supreme Court held that an illness which supervened in the course of and was aggravated by the employment is presumed compensable and the employer has the burden to prove the contrary; that the possibility that the ailments may be caused by the aging process will not be sufficient to remove the same from the periphery of compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the law applies to the young as well as to the aged; and that with the approval of the employee's optional retirement the fact of the latter's disability is placed beyond doubt.

An illness which supervenes in the course of and is aggravated by the employment in the employee's disability to perform his customary work either permanently or for some period of time, is presumed compensable. The burden is on the employer to rebut by satisfactory evidence that legal presumption.

It has been held that where the claimant simply presented a physician's report attesting to his illness and an application for sick leave due to his ailment the said documents had sufficiently substantiated his claim and it was incumbent upon the employer to overthrow by its own evidence the presumption of compensability of the claim of the disabled employee. (Sudario Jr. VWCC, 79 SCRA 337)

 Disability occurs when an employee is disabled from rendering further service due to his physical inability to perform work in the usual and customary way. For purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act there is disability when there is a loss or diminution of earning power which is due to an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. It is not the injury which is compensated but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. (Bello v. WCC, 80 SCRA 153)


While the possibility that the ailment may be caused by the aging process as claimed by respondent employer, nonetheless, that fact alone will not be sufficient to remove the ailment from the periphery of compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Law applies to the young as well as to the aged, and while advancing age may be a controlling factor to the occurrence of an injury, the constant physical and mental exertions, strain, and tension in teaching children of tender age for a period of almost 37 years are equally contributing and aggravating causes which render the resulting disabling injury or ailment compensable under the law. (Bautista v. WCC, 80 SCRA 313)

It has been held in a litany of decisions that with the approval of the employee's optional retirement before his scheduled compulsory retirement at the age of 65, the fact of said employee's disability is placed beyond question of doubt considering that under Commonwealth Act 180 as amended by R.A. 1616 and No. 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No. 133 of the Office of the President, October 16, 1967, optional retirement before reaching the compulsory age of 65 is authorized only when the employee "is physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service."
 

Spouses Lewis vs Court of Appeals

Spouses Lewis vs Court of Appeals
 G.R. No. L-47770. August 10, 1978.


Facts:
The Court of Appeals sustained the writ of execution issued by respondent judge for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond. During the pendency of the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, the Court of First Instance decided on the merits of the appeal in the original case of detainer by dismissing petitioners' appeal and sustaining in toto the decision of the city court.

Issue: 
Whether or not the decision of the city court should be sustained.

Held:
Yes. Finding in the light of the pleadings and record that no substantial grounds exist for attributing "grave and reversible errors of law" to respondent Court of Appeals in sustaining the writ of execution for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond, and the judgment below having become final and executory rendering moot the issue at bar, the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

Where the pleadings and record show that no substantial grounds exist for attributing "grave and reversible errors of law" to respondent Court of Appeals in sustaining the writ of execution for petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond, and where the judgment below has become final and executory the Court of First Instance having decided on the merits of the appeal in the original case of detainer by dismissing petitioners' appeal and sustaining in toto the decision of the city court, the petition for review on certiorari will be dismissed.

PHILSUGIN vs. ASPEM, et al.

Philippine Sugar Institute vs. ASPEM

G.R. No. L-34081. August 19, 1982.

Facts: 
The Philippine Sugar Institute appealed from a resolution on its motion for reconsideration which sustained the claim of the Association of Philsugin Employees that a complaint for unfair labor practice should be heard against it for entering into a return-to-work agreement with a rival labor union, also composed of its employees. The appealed order was assailed as having been issued beyond the scope of respondent court's authority in view of its function being purely governmental in character.


Issue: 
Whether or not the Association of Philsugin Employees (ASPEM) is still existing.


Held:
The Supreme Court, considering that the Philippine Sugar Institute has been abolished under Presidential Decree No. 388 and absorbed by the then newly created Philippine Sugar Commission, found no useful purpose for passing on the merits of the appeal as it may be assumed thereby that the respondent union had likewise caused to exist.

Where the petitioner Philippine Sugar Institute was abolished and absorbed by the Philippine Sugar Commission by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 388 and the respondent union, the Association of Philsugin Employees may likewise be deemed to have ceased to exist, the appeal is dismissed for being moot and academic as no useful purpose would be served by passing on the merits of the case.
 
Case dismissed for being moot and academic.