Chavez vs. Gonzales

Facts: The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti- Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.

Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the “hello Garci” tapes a case of prior restraint?

Ruling: Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

Teotico vs. Del Val

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753

Facts:

            Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor, Ana del Val, had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Issue:
                Whether or not the oppositor Ana del Val Chan, the adopted child of the testatrix’s sister, has the right to intervene in this proceeding?

Held:
                No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. The Supreme Court held that with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio:
                The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

People vs. Leachon

 People vs. Leachon

Facts:
On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge. The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction." From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, thus: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the petition is given due course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19, 1992 and September 1, 1992 are set aside and declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case, i.e., with the presentation of evidence by the accused, then the rebuttal or surrebuttal evidence, if necessary and thereafter, to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED." On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that "urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner." Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. (Misconstruing the provisions of Anti-squatting law)

Held:
No. The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under Sec. 10, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity of legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged "squatters" the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners

Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.

Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.

G.R. No. 146807. May 9, 2002.

Facts:  
            Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM BUILDING). The land on which the building stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, by Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale with a condition that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said lot, together with the improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer.

Thereafter, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of the lots in the Ortigas Center and sought the collection of membership dues from PADCOM. In view of PADCOM'S failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the trial court, but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
            Whether or not PADCOM is unjustly enriched by the improvements made by the Association, thus requiring the former to pay dues to the latter.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that as resident and lot owner in the Ortigas area, PADCOM was definitely benefited by the Association's acts and activities to promote the interests and welfare of those who acquire property therein or benefit from the acts or activities of the Association.

Generally, it may be said that a quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Examples of these principles are: (1) it is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; or (3) one must do unto others what he would want others to do unto him under the same circumstances.

Finally, PADCOM's argument that the collection of monthly dues has no basis since there was no board resolution defining how much fees are to be imposed deserves scant consideration. Suffice it is to say that PADCOM never protested upon receipt of the earlier demands for payment of membership dues. In fact, by proposing a scheme to pay its obligation, PADCOM cannot belatedly question the Association's authority to assess and collect the fees in accordance with the total land area owned or occupied by the members, which finds support in a resolution dated 6 November 1982 of the Association's incorporating directors and Section 2 of its By-laws.

Philippine National Bank vs. Purificacion Vda. De Villarin, et al.

Philippine National Bank vs. Purificacion Vda. De Villarin, et al.

[G.R. No. L-41036. September 5, 1975.

Facts:

The Philippine National Bank obtained in its favor a judgment which became final and executory on August 11, 1956. the judgment debtor died in 1961, and when the Bank learned of his death, it filed, on July 13, 1965, a petition for issuance of letter of administrative of the intestate estate of the deceased judgment debtor. Thereafter, or on March 17, 1966, the Bank filed a claim against the estate based on the judgment rendered in its favor. The Administratrix opposed the claim on the ground that the decision upon which the claim is based is already unenforceable pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code which limits to ten years the prescriptive period within which an action to receive a judgment may be filed.

The Bank countered that its claim has not yet prescribed nor barred by the statute of limitations for although more ten years have already elapsed counted from the time judgment became final and executory, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the partial payment made by the judgment debtor after judgment became executory, indicating his acknowledgment of the existence of the debt.

On September 18, 1967, Porfirio Villarin, Jr. assisted by his mother, Purificacion Vda. de Villarin, likewise filed an opposition to the claim of the petitioner-claimant contending that said claim has been barred by the Statute of Limitations; that the money judgment relied upon by claimant Bank could have been enforced by an independent civil action for revival of judgment under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and that the failure of the claimant Bank to institute such action for revival of judgment within the ten-year period from the time the judgment became final and executory on August 11, 1965 has watered down its claim to a mere natural obligation which does not grant a right of action to enforce its performance.

Issue:
            Whether or not the claim of the Bank has prescribed, making its claim to a mere natural obligation.

Held:
            No. The Supreme Court held that Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." Appellant Bank contends that its claim has not yet prescribed because its right to file the action to revive the aforesaid money judgment was still subsisting when the judgment debtor Porfirio Villarin died on January 18, 1961 and that its right to file an action to revive said money judgment was, after the death of Porfirio Villarin, converted into a claim enforceable only in the settlement of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased. As such, it maintains that the applicable period of prescription is not the 10-year period for filing an action to revive a judgment but the period of prescription for the filing of creditor's claim against the judgment debtor's estate under Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

The records show that on July 13, 1965, the appellant Bank filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the settlement of the intestate estate of Porfirio Villarin and on September 24, 1965, the letters of administration was issued in favor of the widow of Porfirio Villarin, Gregoria Vda. de Villarin. If the money judgment obtained by appellant Bank against Porfirio Villarin became final and executory on August 11, 1955, it has up to August 11, 1965 to file an action to revive the judgment. However, appellant Bank did not actually file an action to revive the money judgment but a claim against the estate of the deceased on March 9, 1966.

Therefore, the claims of the appellant Bank cannot be considered as a natural obligation.

Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.

Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.

G.R. No. L-13667. April 29, 1960.

Facts:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued that “considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:

"(a)A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;

"(b)Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code).

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

            Whether or not the contention of the appellants that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

Held:

         No. Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they discussed in their brief, the Supreme Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.

Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof"

It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.

Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

G.R. No. 152317. November 10, 2004.

Facts:
            The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria Moreño-Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
            Petitioners alleged that with respondent, on March 6, 1992, they engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land where the house stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,000 at Solid Bank Corporation. Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera. Respondent agreed and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,700 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.

However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219 with the lower court for annulment of sale and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

Issue:
            Whether or not the principle of solutio indebiti is applicable in this case.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the payment made by Cross was a mistake. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. It applies where a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.

            The records show that a bank-to-bank payment was made by respondent Wolff to petitioner Cross in favor of co-petitioner Moreño-Lentfer. Respondent was under no duty to make such payment for the benefit of Moreño-Lentfer. There was no binding relation between respondent and the beneficiary, Moreño-Lentfer. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since Moreño-Lentfer received something when there was no right to demand it, she had an obligation to return it.