Ceniza vs. Rubia


Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia
A.C. No. 6166. October 2, 2009

Facts:
            On May 3, 2002, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza, complainant, sought the legal services of the Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, respondent, in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. On July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

Issue:
            Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 18 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.


Held:
            Yes. In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification with the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent's claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. The Supreme Court find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are received by the court. Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court. Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.

However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. The Supreme Court found nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent's act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant's mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the status of their complaint. Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.



Dizon vs. Lambino


Atty. Orlando V. Dizon vs. Atty. Marichu C. Lambino
A.C. No. 6968. October 2, 2009

Facts:
            The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon's move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning. The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

Issue:
            Whether or not the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in “recklessly trying to arrest” the suspects without warrant. It is held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students “cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without renderingit unconstitutional, “they having “a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.” In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI “to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require” and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBICharter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be “in accordance with existing laws and rules.”

Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo


Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo
A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.

Facts:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre.  This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results.  Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter.  The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth of the child.  The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.  In his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character.  His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father despite the affair.  More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making him punishable of Indefinite Suspension.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of two years.  Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al.


PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.

Facts:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.

Issue:
            Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Held:
            No. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Mendoza can be a counsel if Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 without violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. the Supreme Court held that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject “matter” in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Lawyers League vs. Aquino


LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986


FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."


ISSUE: 
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.


HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.  The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Teotico vs. Del Val


Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753

Facts:
            Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor, Ana del Val, had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Issue:
                Whether or not the oppositor Ana del Val Chan, the adopted child of the testatrix’s sister, has the right to intervene in this proceeding?

Held:
                No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. The Supreme Court held that with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.


                The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

Annabelle J. Pomperada vs. Benjamin Jochico y Pama


Annabelle J. Pomperada vs. Benjamin Jochico y Pama
B.M. No. L-68. November 21, 1984

Facts:
            On February 20, 1979, Anabelle J. Pomperada, complainant, and Benjamin Jochico y Pama, respondent, agreed to get married and respondent facilitated all the necessary papers and documents for a marriage contract which turned out to be fake. Respondent had complainant sign a prepared marriage contract and when complainant inquired whether it was necessary for them to appear before the officiating judge, respondent informed her that it was not necessary because the judge knew personally both complainant and respondent, and respondent assured complainant that he would just take care of the signing of the marriage contract by Judge Felino Garcia of the City Court of Bacolod, later respondent gave complainant a copy of the marriage contract which appeared to have been signed already by Judge Garcia.

A verification, however, revealed that the marriage between complainant and respondent was not registered in the Local Civil Registrar's Office and in a further confrontation with Judge Felino Garcia the latter denied having signed the marriage contract and denied as his own the signature which purports to be the signature of Judge Felino Garcia in the marriage contract. Respondent filed income tax returns jointly with Nenita Martelino Ureta, the latter indicated as his spouse for the years 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 and enumerated two children as dependents. Then in the years 1979 and 1980 he filed income tax returns but he indicated complainant as his spouse.

Issue:
            Whether or not the respondent committed a gross immoral conduct, making him disqualified from the mass oath taking.




Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed a gross immoral conduct, and in effect, he is disqualified from mass oath taking. It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution, which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). Respondent's testimony was a long and clear admission of illicit liaison with Complainant for nine years, and before that with another woman, and of the filing of false Income Tax Returns. Those actuations do not conform to the standard norms of honesty, decency and moral conduct required of an aspiring member of the legal profession. Accordingly, the petition of respondent to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys is hereby denied. The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all Courts that the respondent has not been allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar.

Tan vs. Court of Appeals

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO T...