G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998
Facts:
Eduardo Agbayani was
sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City for
raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The conviction was based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante Baltazar, the victim and
SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.
The defense, on the
other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the evidence
presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was
retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal evidence
claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.
Hence, in this appeal
the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony of the victim in view
of her execution of the affidavit of desistance.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony is superior than affidavit(s)
Held:
YES. The Court ruled that
affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior
to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of recantation have been
invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave
it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make
a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
The decision of the
trial court is affirmed.
It is settled that the
failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with
the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that
such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the
contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the
accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right.
In the instant case, the
trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the
appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first
witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. Besides, it is only in this
appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to
inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in
the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted
by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive
cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right
to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right
to counsel.