Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.


Primitivo Ansay, etc., et al. vs. The Board of Directors of National Development Company, et al.
G.R. No. L-13667. April 29, 1960.

Facts:
On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued that “considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:
"(a)A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;
"(b)Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code).
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.


Issue:
            Whether or not the contention of the appellants that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.





Held:
         No. Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they discussed in their brief, the Supreme Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof"
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.



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