Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, et al. vs. Hans Jurgen Wolff

G.R. No. 152317. November 10, 2004.

Facts:
            The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria Moreño-Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
            Petitioners alleged that with respondent, on March 6, 1992, they engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land where the house stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,000 at Solid Bank Corporation. Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera. Respondent agreed and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,700 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.

However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219 with the lower court for annulment of sale and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

Issue:
            Whether or not the principle of solutio indebiti is applicable in this case.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the payment made by Cross was a mistake. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. It applies where a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.

            The records show that a bank-to-bank payment was made by respondent Wolff to petitioner Cross in favor of co-petitioner Moreño-Lentfer. Respondent was under no duty to make such payment for the benefit of Moreño-Lentfer. There was no binding relation between respondent and the beneficiary, Moreño-Lentfer. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since Moreño-Lentfer received something when there was no right to demand it, she had an obligation to return it.

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 134114. July 6, 2001.

Facts:

Petitioner Nestle Philippines, Inc. transacted sixteen separate importations of milk and milk products from different countries between the period of July and November 1984. It paid the corresponding customs duties and advance sales taxes to the Collector of Customs of Manila for each transaction based on the published Home Consumption Value (HCV) as indicated in the Bureau of Customs Revision Orders, but it seasonably filed the corresponding protests before the said Collector of Customs. In the said protests, petitioner claimed for the refund of the alleged overpaid import duties and advance sales taxes. With regards to the advance sales taxes, the Court of Tax Appeals eventually ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the Collector of Customs failed to render a decision on the sixteen protest cases for almost six years for the alleged overpaid customs duties. In order to prevent the claims from becoming stale on the ground of prescription, petitioner immediately filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed the said petition for want of jurisdiction. The issue was raised to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review, but it was also dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue:
            Whether or not the petitioner’s claims are governed by the rule on quasi-contracts or solutio indebiti which prescribes in six (6) years under Article 1145 of the New Civil Code.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the rule on quasi-contracts or solution indebiti is not applicable in this case. In order for the rule on solution indebiti to apply, it is an essential condition that petitioner must first show that its payment of the customs duties was in excess of what was required by the law at the time when the subject sixteen importations of milk and milk products were made. Unless shown otherwise, the disputable presumption of regularity of performance of duty lies in favor of the Collector of Customs.

In the present case, there is no factual showing that the collection of the alleged overpaid customs duties was more than what is required of the petitioner when it made the aforesaid separate importations. There is no factual finding yet by the government agency concerned that petitioner is indeed entitled to its claim of overpayment and, if true, for how much it is entitled. It bears stress that in determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to refund of alleged overpayment of customs duties, it is necessary to determine exactly how much the Government is entitled to collect as customs duties on the importations. Thus, it would only be just and fair that the petitioner-taxpayer and the Government alike be given equal opportunities to avail of the remedies under the law to contest or defeat each other's claim and to determine all matters of dispute between them in one single case. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments, if truly proven, of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.

Thus, the remand of this case to the CTA is warranted for the proper verification and determination of the factual basis and merits of the petition and in order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play may be subserved. In the light of Sections 2308 and 2309 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it appeared that in all cases subject to protest, the claim for refund of customs duties may be foreclosed only when the interested party claiming refund fails to file a written protest before the Collector of Customs. Accordingly, once a written protest is seasonably filed with the Collector of Customs the failure or inaction of the latter to promptly perform his mandated duty under the Tariff and Customs Code should not be allowed to prejudice the right of the party adversely affected thereby. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it, if any is proven, and thereby enrich itself at the expense of the taxpayers.

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. vs. PCGG

G.R. No. 96087 March 31, 1992.

Facts:

On June 30, 1987, the PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0034, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto S. Benedicto, Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, et al." to recover from the defendants (including Roberto S. Benedicto) their ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which they amassed through breach of trust and abuse of the prerogatives of public office, and in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the land.

On November 3, 1990, the PCGG, through its chairman, David M. Castro, executed a Compromise Agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto ceding to the latter a substantial part of his ill-gotten assets and granting him immunity from further prosecution. On November 25, 1990, the compromise agreement was submitted by the parties to the Sandiganbayan for approval.

On November 29, 1990, the Court directed the PCGG to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the assailed Compromise Agreement.

Commenting on the petition, the PCGG alleged that the rationale for the Compromise Agreement was the Government's desire to immediately accomplish its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto's desire to lead a peaceful and normal life. Toward this end, the parties decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims in the cases pending in the Philippines. The PCGG's authority to enter into compromises involving ill-gotten wealth and to grant immunity in civil and criminal cases had been challenged before, but it was sustained by this Court in "Republic of the Philippines and Jose Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al." G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989, 173 SCRA 72).

On January 15, 1991, this Court granted the PCGG's motion to suspend consideration by the Sandiganbayan of the "Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement" filed in that court by the PCGG and Benedicto.

The petitioner filed a reply to the comment stating that the issue in this case is not the basic authority of the Commission to enter into a compromise settlement of the liabilities and accountabilities of the Marcoses, but the legality of the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which, according to the petitioner, was entered into by the Commission without and beyond its lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion, for it grants Benedicto final, total, and irrevocable immunity from criminal prosecution, sans compliance with the specific conditions imposed therefor by Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14, as amended, in relation to Executive Order No. 2

Issue:
            Whether or not the Compromise Agreement with Benedicto which was entered into by the PCGG is beyond the latter’s lawful authority and with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
            No. the Supreme Court held that the petition in this case has no merit. The right of parties in a civil action to enter into a compromise for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an end to one already commenced is indisputable. The settlement of civil cases in court is authorized and even encouraged by law (Arts. 2028 and 2029, Civil Code). Although there is no similar general rule in criminal prosecutions, that "in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on amicable settlements and/or compromises on civil cases under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases.”

In the light of this ruling, and in view of the reorganization of the Boards of Directors of RPN, IBC and BBC television stations to administer and manage those sequestered Broadcast City companies, the authority of the Board of Administrators as "trustee and officious manager" of the same corporations, has become functus oficio. In negotiorum gestio, the authority of the officious manager of a property or business is extinguished when the owner demands the return of the same (Art. 2153, Civil Code). With the reorganization of the respective Boards of Directors of the Broadcast City companies, where PCGG controls 2/3 of the board membership, the Board of Administrators has become a supernumerary. The reason for its existence has ceased. This view is bolstered by the fact that Broadcast City is not a purely commercial venture but a media enterprise covered by the freedom of the press provision of the Constitution, and that under our ruling in Liwayway Publishing, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, et al. (160 SCRA 716), the Government, through the PCGG, may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media to maintain its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. XVI, Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

Manuel Torres, Jr. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120138. September 5, 1997.

Facts:

Petitioner, the late Judge Torres, was the majority stockholder of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation (Tormil), while private respondents, his nieces and nephews, were the minority stockholders. To make substantial savings in taxes, Judge Torres adopted an "estate planning" scheme assigning to Tormil several of his personal and real properties. In turn, Tormil issued 225,000 of its unissued shares in exchange for his properties in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Makati and Pasay. However, Judge Torres unilaterally revoked two deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay for failure of Tormil to issue the remaining balance of 972 shares. Due to the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay properties from the corporation's inventory of assets and financial records, private respondent filed a complaint with the SEC to compel Judge Torres to deliver to the corporation the two deeds of assignment.

Another controversy involving the parties was the election of the 1987 corporate board of directors. During the stockholders meeting, petitioner Pabalan and company were nominated and elected members of the Board after Judge Torres made an assignment of one share to each of them from his own shares. Said assignments were recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. Private respondents, claiming they were denied their right to pre-emption, filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Panel of Hearing Officers of the SEC ruled in favor of private respondents and declared null and void the election and appointment of the members of the board. During the pendency of the appeal to the SEC en banc, Judge Torres died. Notice of his death was brought to the attention of the SEC by private respondents. Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that there was no administrator or legal representative of Judge Torres' estate appointed by the court. The SEC En Banc denied said motion, and thereafter rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, without requiring the transmission of the original records of the proceedings before the SEC, dismissed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being rendered without the necessary substitution of parties, for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr, when it is sought to justify the non-substitution by its application of the concept of negotiorun gestio.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the concept of negotiorum gestio is not applicable in this case. Said principle explicitly covers abandoned or neglected property or business. Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as they were on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge Torres' will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate. As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31 October 1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings, however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P. Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children of his late brother Antonio A. Torres.

It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the same parties fighting over the representation of the late Judge Torres' estate. It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the probate proceedings of Judge Torres' holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres' estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.

It is appropriate to mention here that when Judge Torres died on April 3, 1991, the SEC en banc had already fully heard the parties and what remained was the evaluation of the evidence and rendition of the judgment. Further, petitioners filed their motions to suspend proceedings only after more than two (2) years from the death of Judge Torres. Petitioners' counsel was even remiss in his duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Instead, it was private respondents who informed the SEC of Judge Torres' death through a manifestation dated 24 April 1991.

For the SEC en banc to have suspended the proceedings to await the appointment of the legal representative by the estate was impractical and would have caused undue delay in the proceedings and a denial of justice. There is no telling when the probate court will decide the issue, which may still be appealed to the higher courts.

In any case, there has been no final disposition of the properties of the late Judge Torres before the SEC. On the contrary, the decision of the SEC en banc as affirmed by the Court of Appeals served to protect and preserve his estate. Consequently, the rule that when a party dies, he should be substituted by his legal representative to protect the interests of his estate in observance of due process was not violated in this case in view of its peculiar situation where the estate was fully protected by the presence of the parties who claim interests therein either as directors, stockholders or heirs.

 

Soriano vs. La Guardia

Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 144801.  March 10, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

            Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

           

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

Ceniza vs. Rubia

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

A.C. No. 6166. October 2, 2009

Facts:

            On May 3, 2002, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza, complainant, sought the legal services of the Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, respondent, in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. On July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

Issue:

            Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 18 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

            Yes. In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification with the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent's claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. The Supreme Court find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are received by the court. Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court. Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.

However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. The Supreme Court found nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent's act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant's mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the status of their complaint. Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Dizon vs. Lambino

Atty. Orlando V. Dizon vs. Atty. Marichu C. Lambino

A.C. No. 6968. October 2, 2009

Facts:

            The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon's move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning. The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

Issue:

            Whether or not the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in “recklessly trying to arrest” the suspects without warrant. It is held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students “cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without renderingit unconstitutional, “they having “a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.” In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI “to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require” and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBICharter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be “in accordance with existing laws and rules.”

Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.

Facts:

Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre.  This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results.  Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter.  The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth of the child.  The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.  In his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character.  His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father despite the affair.  More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making him punishable of Indefinite Suspension.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of two years.  Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.