Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.

Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.

Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.


The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Perez vs Mendoza

Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.
When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;
that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.


Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review
with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the
Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings