Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar


Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998

Facts:
            Remedios Ramirez Tapucar, the complainant, and Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, the respondent, were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a Court of First Instance (CFI)  Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father.

Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case. Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed an act of gross immoral conduct, if so, does that constitute a ground for his disbarment.

Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed a grossly immoral conduct, which constitutes a ground for his disbarment. In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.

All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct--both public and private-- fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

In Re Charges of Lilian F. Villasanta for Immorality vs. Hilarion M. Peralta


In Re Charges of Lilian F. Villasanta for Immorality vs. Hilarion M. Peralta
April 30, 1957.
Facts:
            On April 16, 1939, Hilarion M. Peralta, the respondent, was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted Lilian F. Villasanta, the complainant, who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.
Issue:
            Whether or not the respondent’s grossly immoral conduct makes him disqualified to take the bar examination.
Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that committed a grossly immoral conduct, thus, he is disqualified to take the bar examinations. Hilarion M. Peralta, the respondent, made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity and his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code involves moral turpitude. His act in contracting the second marriage even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

Manosca vs. CA

Manosca vs. CA 
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996 


Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

 Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Tan vs. Court of Appeals

ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN and EDUARDO V. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO T...